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ABSTRAK
Studi ini membahas tentang pemicu konflik dalam pembangunan Bandara Internasi-
onal Yogyakarta (YIA) di Temon, Kulon Progo, dengan menggunakan kerangka politik 
ekonomi. Penelitian ini menggunakan teori dominasi elit berbasis lahan atas mesin per-
tumbuhan perkotaan dan teori-teori yang menjelaskan pemicu konflik yang disebabkan 
oleh pembangunan dan pembangunan infrastruktur. Temuan studi ini menunjukkan 
bahwa konflik tersebut didorong oleh ketidaksepakatan mengenai sumber daya lahan 
yang muncul dari ambisi pemerintah untuk merespon tekanan untuk mengubah lahan 
pedesaan di wilayah tersebut menjadi kawasan perkotaan dengan konsep aerotro-
polis dan MICE. Desakan tersebut datang dari kepentingan kelompok elite lokal dan 
nasional, yang melengkapi masalah dominasi kepemilikan tanah yang masih ada oleh 
elit politik lokal Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta. Dengan demikian, konflik tidak hanya 
terkait dengan pembangunan infrastruktur tetapi juga konflik lahan yang muncul dari 
kebijakan pembangunan perkotaan. Pemicu konflik lainnya termasuk tata kelola proyek 
yang buruk dan faktor-faktor sosial lain.
Kata kunci : konflik agraria, infrastruktur, ekonomi politik, politik perkotaan, dominasi 
elite.
ABSTRACT
The study discusses the drivers of conflict in the construction of Yogyakarta Interna-
tional Airport (YIA) in Temon, Kulon Progo, using a politico-economic framework. This 
research employs the theory of land-based elite domination of urban growth machines 
and theories that explain the drivers of conflicts caused by construction and develop-
ment of infrastructure. The findings of this study show that the conflict was driven 
by disagreements on land resource that emerged from the government’s ambition to 
respond to the pressure to transform the rural lands in the region into an urban area 
under the concepts of aerotropolis and MICE. The pressure came from the interests of 
local and national elite groups, which complemented the extant problem of domination 
of land ownership by the local political elites of Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta. Thus, 
the conflict was related to not only the development of infrastructure but also a land 
conflict that arose from urban development policies. The other drivers of the conflict 
include poor governance of the project and social factors.
Keywords: agrarian conflict, infrastructure, political economy, urban politics, elite 
domination.
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INTRODUCTION
Discourse on the tourism industry is relatively new to the field of re-
search on land and natural resource conflicts in the past decade. There 
are several reasons for this lack of discussion on this subject: (1) the frag-
mentation of the tourism industry and the many stakeholders involved; 
(2) the industry’s association with leisure and tertiary needs, resulting 
in issues or cases of eviction being ignored; and (3) the concentration 
of advocacy groups’ focus on the violation of land rights by extractive 
industries—such as mining and agroindustry—because of the large 
scope of land right violations. However, access to land is a necessary 
prerequisite for the growth of tourism, supported by the provision of 
public facilities and infrastructure.
Land conflicts in the face of the growth of the tourism industry 
can be attributed to various factors, such as the rights of the people 
impacted, management of the tourism industry or business, and the 
environmental, economic, and social risks that the project or its devel-
opment poses (Boudet, Jayasurendra, and Davis 2011; Ghimire 2012). 
Conflicts may also ensue because of information discrepancy (Park et 
al. 2017). At certain stages of intensity, conflicts may also be triggered 
by the failure to tend to the demands of the people or parties involved; 
by difference in perceptions during consultation and compensation; 
by problems in administrative procedure; and by the lack of govern-
ment efforts to resolve the conflicts (Lam and Woo 2009). The analysis 
of political economy in studies on conflicts pertaining to infrastruc-
ture development cannot be ignored, such as an explanation on elite 
domination of infrastructure policies (Musgrave and Wong 2016). The 
exploitation of natural resources for the development of infrastructure 
that only benefits the elites may also be a cause for conflict (Mashatt, 
Long, and Crum 2008).
Conflicts caused by elite domination may happen due to the scarcity 
and monopoly of resources by the state, private companies, or social 
elites through the acquisition/seizure of resources (Robbins 2012). This 
elite domination is in accordance with what is called elite capture, that 
is, the effort or measures taken by those in possession of power and 
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wealth to reap benefits from new opportunities and accumulate wealth 
and power (Colfer and Capistrano 2006). The present research aims 
to show that drivers of infrastructure development-related conflicts are 
not limited to problems in management or governance and the so-
cial and economic effects of the projects but also extend to the elites’ 
domination, which results in policies that mainly cater to their interests. 
These conflict drivers are reflected in the case of the construction of 
the New Yogyakarta International Airport (NYIA) in Temon District, 
Kulon Progo Regency, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta/Special Region of 
Yogyakarta (DIY).
Construction and investment in infrastructure are integral to the 
process of transitional urban development. In other words, investment 
and development of infrastructure are prerequisites for the growth of ur-
ban areas (Ingram and Kessides 1994). The author’s findings show that 
conflicts pertaining to urban development are caused by land conflicts 
that emerge as a result the government’s ambition to respond to the 
pressure to develop rural areas into urban areas, using the concept of 
aerotropolis. Land conflicts tend to intensify when faced with the rapid 
growth of urban areas in peri-urban zones, which is indicated by the 
transition of areal use from rural to urban use (Lombard 2016). These 
pressures are result of the interests of the national and local elites, as 
well as the domination of land ownership by local political elites in DIY.
Furthermore, vertical conflicts between the residents impacted by 
the construction and the political-economic elites involved in the de-
velopment of the NYIA megaproject are often linked to risks of ecologic 
degradation, which were discussed in academic studies by NGOs and 
intellectual as well as environmental groups. Similar to other recent 
and complex agrarian conflicts in Indonesia, these conflicts happen 
due to the absence of efforts to resolve them, issues and threats related 
to environmental destruction, and the concentration of land ownership 
among a number of elites (Rachman 2015). The emergence of agrarian 
conflicts cannot be separated from the government’s economic ambi-
tion to bolster infrastructure development. The Joko Widodo adminis-
tration planned to achieve this target through three key steps: ease in 
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the granting of licenses, provision of land, and funding through loans 
(Wahid et al. 2017). These steps show how the development of physi-
cal infrastructure emphasizes goals, while it marginalizes the people’s 
interests and participation. Therefore, the research question that the 
author aims to answer in this study is, what are the drivers of the conflict 
in the case of the NYIA megaproject construction in Temon District, 
Kulon Progo Regency in 2012–18?
LITER ATUR E R EV IEW
Land-based elite domination in urban 
growth machine theory
This theory is derived from the theory of the urban as a growth ma-
chine, which is essentially developed based on elite theory. The theory’s 
main thesis is that the orientation of urban or local development poli-
cies tends to revolve around elite interests through the intensification 
of land use. Through a neo-marxist approach, this theory was then de-
veloped by Molotch (1976), who regard the urban area as a competition 
arena in the field of land development. This premise is based on the 
logic of the modern state, where land is regarded as the most valuable 
commodity to obtain economic benefits.
In the shaping of the urban system, Harding (1995) states that there 
is an exclusive correlation between two types of power, parochial capital 
and metropolitan capital. Parochial capital possesses assets in the form 
of land and other immovable property, while metropolitan capital holds 
assets in the form of money or investment. These two types of power co-
alesce to productively develop land based on its exchange value, which 
is the opposite of its use value (Vogel 1997).
In Logan and Molotch’s theory, a clash of interests happens be-
tween the progrowth coalition and antigrowth coalition. The strongest 
driver behind the growth of an urban area is the progrowth coalition 
that is formed by land-based elites, who comprise politicians and busi-
ness groups. These entities have control over material and intellectual 
resources to increase the value of land ownership (Parker 2004). Con-
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versely, the antigrowth coalition believes that development initiatives 
do not always bring benefits but, rather, negative impacts, such as the 
marginalization of independent economic management and environ-
mental degradation. To them, these impacts are the manifestation of 
elite interests (Molotch 1976).
This theory is founded on several explicit key concepts (Rodgers 
2009). The first concept pertains to exchange value, use value, and 
space. This concept regards space as a commodity not only as the ba-
sis of collective livelihood or a result of social activities but also as 
means to acquire wealth. The second concept is the land-based elites 
or place entrepreneurs, who are elites involved in the commodification 
of land exchange and lease. Land-based elites are those who acquire 
the ownership of land through inheritance or feudalism and purchase 
(Rodgers 2009). The third concept is the growth machine alliance, 
or the coalition of elites, which comprises land-based elites who have 
domination and influence over the orientation of urban development 
initiatives. These elites have strong connections with local politicians, 
media, and transportation agencies or companies. The fourth concept 
is asset or mobile capital, which unites the interests of elites that fuel 
the growth machine. The fifth concept is the promotion of growth as 
a public good (Rodgers 2009).
Drivers of conf licts in the development 
of inf rastructure projects
Based on research from Watkins et al. (2017) on conflicts in the devel-
opment of infrastructure projects in Latin America and the Caribbean 
over five decades, there are several categories of drivers of conflicts in 
infrastructure projects: (1) environmental, (2) social, (3) governance, (4) 
economic. These drivers are interrelated; the emergence of one driver 
will stimulate the emergence of the others (Watkins et al. 2017). Two 
main driver categories are relevant to this research: the governance and 
social drivers. The governance driver emerges because of bad project 
planning that comprises the setting of location and the development of 
the area postconstruction, as well as minimum consultation between 
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the project executor and the people. The environmental driver in this 
conflict is linked to several issues, such as the degradation of the eco-
system, pollution, deforestation, and climate change caused by the in-
frastructure project (Watkins et al. 2017).
The economic driver is related to several aspects. First, the inabil-
ity of the government to complete the project in accordance with its 
initial planning. Second, the unfair distribution of benefits that drew 
complaints on the centralization of benefits to only urban areas by the 
local communities. Third, the overpriced services and benefits of the 
infrastructure. The local community and stakeholders often agree that 
the costs of projects are too high, which result in the high price of ser-
vices they provide. Fourth, conflicts that involve demands to increase 
the wage of workers (Watkins et al. 2017).
The social driver pertains to the societal perception that certain 
projects only bring unsatisfactory benefits or compensation, or harm 
to the local community and stakeholders. Several examples of these 
issues are the deprivation of access to farming and water resources that 
make up the independent economic management or the community’s 
livelihood, as well as a low number of job vacancies. The impact on 
the society’s traditional values often also plays a part in the emergence 
of resistance from the impacted communities (Watkins et al. 2017).
R ESEA RCH METHOD
In this research, the author employs a qualitative method, a social re-
search approach that aims to analyze a social phenomenon holistically 
and comprehensively. According to Creswell (2003), qualitative research 
is a method that analyzes the condition of an object or phenomenon, 
in which the researcher is the key instrument. Thus, the research is 
conducted in an interactive manner and involves the exchange of social 
experiences as perceived by the involved individuals. The data collec-
tion techniques that the author employs in this research are literature re-
views, observation, in-depth interview, and documentation. In analyzing 
the present case, the author uses a neo-marxist approach, which regards 
economic factors, including production and transaction/exchange, as 
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the triggers to social changes in capitalistic societies. These changes 
usually occur through conflictual interclass interactions. These inter-
actions are integral to the domination and exploitation expressed by 
the radical egalitarianism employed by a normative Marxist agenda 
(Wright 2005).
DISCUSSION
Context of agrarian politics in 
Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta
Although the status of Kasultanan Yogyakarta was changed to DIY on 
March 3, 1950, after the country’s independence, the laws of the land 
in the region are still based on the monarchical concept that regards 
the sultan as the dominant ruler. This provision is part of Law No. 
3/1950, Article 4 Clause 1 Point 3 that stipulates the autonomy of DIY, 
including its agrarian and land matters. In relation to this provision, the 
government of DIY established Perda (Regional Regulation) No. 5/1954 
on Land Rights outside Kota Praja, while lands inside the borders of 
Kota Praja are still governed by old regulations from the Dutch colonial 
era (Dewa 2017).
The Kasultanan land is divided into two parts: SG, which comprises 
Kota Yogyakarta, Sleman, Bantul, Gunung Kidul, and the mountain-
ous area of Kulon Progo; and PAG, which comprises the southern coast 
of Kabupaten Kulon Progo. SG includes the crown Domain, which 
consists of inheritable governmental attributes, such as the palace, the 
city square, kepatihan, pasar ngasem, guest houses, the Gunung Kidul 
Forest, and the Grand Mosque as well as the Sutanaad Ground, along 
with the rights given to the people (Putra 2015). Usually, the land use of 
SG is accompanied by Surat kekancingan from the Panitikismo. PAG is 
the land ruled by Kadipaten Pakualaman and cultivated by its people or 
the Kadipaten itself. The village authorities are given rights to use and 
develop tanah Kas Desa, both from the Kadipaten and the Kasultanan, 
as their pay (Hasim 2016).
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On September 24, 1960, the government passed Law No. 5 on Ba-
sic Agrarian Law (UUPA) to unify the national laws on agrarian land. 
However, before 1984, the enactment of the UUPA did not apply to 
the entirety of DIY. The fourth dictum of the UUPA stipulates that 
the rights and authority over land and water in the area and ex-area of 
swapraja (self-government) are given to the state since the enactment 
of the UUPA and would be further regulated through PP (Government 
Regulations-Peraturan Pemerintah). To fill in the gap in the law caused 
by the yet-to-be-formulated PP, the government of DIY enacted Special 
Regional Regulation or Perda Istimewa (Perdais) No. 5/1954 and Perda 
No. 10/1964 (Dewa 2017).
In 1973, Sultan HB IX sent a request to the minister of home af-
fairs, who held the authority to oversee national agrarian matters at the 
time, to treat DIY equally to other regions in regard to agrarian mat-
ters. The request was granted through the formulation of Presidential 
Decree (Keppres) No. 3/1984, which stipulates the UUPA 1960 to be 
fully enacted in DIY and regulated by the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(Mardaningrum 2010). The enactment of the Keppres meant that the 
country’s agrarian laws were to apply nationally, including the swapraja 
(self-government) regions of DIY.
The government of DIY then established Perda No. 3/1984 as a 
follow-up legal mechanism to the Keppres. The third article of the Perda 
states several old provisions on the autonomy of DIY swapraja (self-
governing) regions pertaining to their land. These provisions originated 
from the era of Dutch colonialism. The provisions were Rijksblaad 
Kasultanan No. 16 and 18 Tahun 1989, Rijksblaad Kasultanan No. 11 
Tahun 1928 jo. 1931 No. 2 and Rijskblaad Paku Alaman No. 13 Tahun 
1928 jo. No. 1 / 1931, Rijskblaad Kasultanan No. 23 Tahun 1925, and 
Rijskblad Paku Alaman No. 25 Tahun 1925 (Kusumoharyono 2006; 
Antoro 2013). However, according to the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
through the passing of Ministerial Decree of Home Affairs (Keputusan 
Menteri Dalam Negeri) No. 66/1984, the full enactment of the UUPA 
1960 in DIY was to be implemented gradually (Huda 2000).
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The enactment of the UUPA in DIY did not result in the unifying 
of agrarian laws in the period after 1984. After the central government 
established Law No. 13/2012 on Yogyakarta’s Special Status (Undang-
Undang Keistimewaan Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta- UUK), the govern-
ment of DIY formulated Perdais Yogyakarta No. 1/2013 (Yogyakarta 
Special Law), which fundamentally legitimizes a feudal dominant 
system over swapraja land by the Kasultanan and Kadipaten. The Ka-
sultanan and Kadipaten were then given status as legal entities (Sari, 
Silviana, and Prasetyo 2016). The formulation of UUK began on May 
10, 2012, when Sri Sultan HB X announced Sabdatama as the high-
est law in DIY, parallel to the constitution. These types of laws were 
rarely made by the previous sultans unless it was deemed necessary to 
overcome severe social conditions in DIY, such as what Sri Sultan HB 
IX did to resolve turmoil just after the country’s independence.
Shortly after, the UUK No. 13/2012 was established on August 
31, 2012. The formulation of the UUK draft began in 2000 and was 
proposed to the central government to be discussed by the House of 
Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) in 2002. However, because 
DIY was not a province with issues linked to separatism, the UUK 
draft did not receive positive feedback from the central government 
(Bhakti 2010). It was only in 2010, during President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s term, that the UUK draft was reproposed to the central 
government. The reproposal was not without its pros and cons, as the 
president initially expressed his hesitance to recognize the “sovereignty” 
of DIY (Wahyu 2018).
In comparison to other swapraja (self-governing) areas, Kasultanan 
and Pakualaman Yogyakarta were able to take advantage of political op-
portunities in every rotation of political power in Indonesia. Both took 
part in national movements and held important positions in the formal 
political sphere, so they were able to maintain their influence at the 
national and local levels (Antoro 2015). One of those roles is Sri Sultan 
HB IX’s willingness to provide protection to several of the country’s 
political leaders and lend his land as the country’s emergency capital 
city during the country’s fight for independence (Bhakti 2010). These 
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political contributions gave DIY a relatively strong influence over the 
central government’s decision to maintain its special status.
The elitist character of the effort to maintain DIY’s traditional po-
litical rule was demonstrated during the sultanate’s fight for the UUK. 
The circulation of the draft among officials was minimal and often only 
involved local officials, such as the heads of villages (Pranoto 2017). 
The institutionalization of UU Keistimewaan was also supported by 
several arguments (Antoro 2017). The first argument pertained to his-
tory, stating that the palace—which consists of the Kasultanan and 
Pakualaman—was a sovereign political entity before Indonesia gained 
its independence. The second argument was that the special status of 
the Kasultanan and Pakualaman’s rights and authority was not regulated 
by Indonesian law, which indicated a vacuum of power especially in 
regard to the matters of land. Third was the political argument that the 
revitalization of the UUPA is needed to accommodate swapraja (self-
government) land rights (Antoro 2017).
To exercise its special status and rights, the DIY provincial govern-
ment receives annual funding from the national budget (APBN), which 
increases each year. In contrast to Otsus (special autonomy), this fund-
ing does not have a time limit and will be continuously granted as long 
as the region’s special status is recognized by the central government. 
Regarding land governance, special funds were also allocated to the 
certification of the palace’s estate, as stated in Rijksblad Kasultanan 
Yogyakarta No. 16 Tahun 1918 and Rijksblad Pakualaman No. 18 Tahun 
1918. In its execution, matters pertaining to the sultanate’s lands are 
often difficult as the Kasultanan and Pakualaman, as legal entities, are 
untouched by the audit on wealth and obligation of taxation (Idhom 
2017). 
Essentially, the agrarian political context in DIY today is not the 
fault of its governance, but rather of the design of the country’s de-
velopment layout from the colonial era until today (Pranoto 2017). 
The region’s agrarian political context is shaped by the convergence of 
the statist land rule system and neocustomary system, where the state 
also indirectly rules the region by strengthening the traditional elites 
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through the granting of autonomy (Pranoto 2017). This indirect rule 
by the state complements the state’s position as the sole authority over 
lands recognized by the constitution and the state’s legal provisions.
In its course of development, the state can control village residents 
through eviction (Pranoto 2017). This condition is made possible 
through the country’s acceptance of various laws during the colonial 
era, where the plurality of legal frameworks was taken as part of the 
Indonesian society’s authenticity. The people, especially those in rural 
areas, are usually not aware that the plurality of legal frameworks tends 
to benefit the elites (Pranoto 2017).
Studies in the field of political economy have demonstrated that the 
political authorities of the palace elites in UU Keistimewaan facilitate 
the Kasultanan and Kadipaten’s domination in various sectors, includ-
ing control over land, decision-making pertaining to spatial governance 
and function, circulation of investment, and control over institutions 
and local governance (Subektie 2018). This domination of land owner-
ship is often brought up in debates on the resilience of the monarchy 
and oligarchy in the country’s democracy. UU Keistimewaan provides 
legal justification for the government of DIY in the making of several 
policies, such as the certification of land in SG and PAG, transfers of 
land title to the palace, and temporary termination of extensions of 
usage rights and building rights for state-owned lands (Gerakan Ma-
syarakat Penerus Amanat Sultan HB IX 2015).
Land certification processes are usually accompanied by the acquisi-
tion and seizure of land by the Kadipaten Pakualaman and Kasultanan 
DIY elites. Sri Sultan HB X has repeatedly emphasized the legalization 
of SG and PAG through UU Keistimewaan (Aditjondro 2011). A number 
of regulations have also been enacted to legitimize SG and PAG, such 
as DIY Gubernatorial Regulation No. 112/2014 on the Utilization of 
Village Land, Perdais No. 2/2017 on the Spatial Planning of Kasultan-
an’s and Kadipaten’s Land, and Perdais No. 1/2017 on the Management 
and Utilization of Kasultanan’s and Kadipaten’s Land (Subektie 2018).
The UUK was often claimed to preserve the legal contradiction 
between the colonial land laws, Rijksblad Kasultanan Yogyakarta No. 
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16 Tahun 1918 and Rijksblad Pakualaman No. 18 Tahun 1918, and the 
UUPA 1960. The claim is based on the returning of lands previously 
owned by the people as stipulated in the UUPA 1960 to the owner-
ship of the Kasultanan (SG) and Kadipaten Pakualaman (PAG) (Goldie 
2018). After their eviction, the people only have rights to the lease 
or use of the land, usually known as magersari. The palace may take 
away the land whenever it wishes. This condition will create unfair and 
undemocratic political-economic relations, as well as decrease people’s 
access to land (Idhom 2017).
These socioeconomic realities indicate that the political economy of 
the UUK along with its legal derivatives are a manifestation of the Ka-
sultanan and Pakualaman’s efforts to reorganize the colonial character 
of swapraja by securing their positions as governors from generation to 
generation (Antoro 2016). The consequences of these practices are often 
ignored due to the many justifications made to dismiss them. One of 
those justifications is that the swapraja is no different from customary 
communities that are subject to customary laws. Kasultanan and Kadi-
paten Pakualaman perceive SG and PAS as tanah ulayat, or customary 
land, excluding them from the jurisdiction of the UUPA. These claims 
have received challenges from academic studies that showed the differ-
ences between customary laws and swapraja (Antoro 2015).
One of the harmful political-economic implications of this political-
economic reality for people is the liberalization of land utilization that 
involves landlords and investors through Surat kekancingan. Panitikismo, 
the institution that manages the land matters of the palace, can issue 
Surat kekancingan to accommodate the interests of investors regarding 
SG land (Suroatmojo 2017). The BPN (Badan Pertanahan Nasional/
National Land Agency) of DIY has issued building rights that strength-
en the Pakualaman’s ownership claim and legitimized the Kadipaten’s 
authority to transfer financial compensation through consignation to 
village residents whose lands were confiscated.
Data from 2014 demonstrates that the most extensive areas of SG 
and PAG are located in Kabupaten Kulon Progo, and these areas cover 
26,451,247 ha, or 52.24% of total SG and PAG lands (Hasim 2016). Cur-
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rently, the areas of PAG are more dominant (Aditjondro 2011). These 
areas will expand along with the inventory and certification of SG and 
PAG in reference to the original of 1838 and the national budget. Since 
the enactment of MP3EI in 2011, DIY has become the destination of 
increasing capital and investment. In 2010, the investment amounted 
to IDR4.3 trillion; the number increased to IDR7.75 trillion in 2012 
(Yogyakarta 2016). This development shows how the DIY’s special sta-
tus, under the guise of regional autonomy in the UUK, was not a mat-
ter of governance and administration, but rather the reorganization of 
oligarchic power and the Kasultanan Yogyakarta elite domination over 
agrarian rule. This premise is emboldened by the fact that the royal 
family’s business networks have control over a large number of compa-
nies from various sectors and influence over the appointment of royal 
family members in DIY’s social, economic, and political institutions 
(Aditjondro 2011).
The power of the Kasultanan and Pakualaman’s claim over SG and 
PAG was shown at the national conciliation FGD forum held by the 
National Commission on Human Rights of Indonesia (Komnas HAM) 
in November 11–14, 2015, which invited academicians and the governor 
of DIY. When asked about the conflicts occurring on SG and PAG 
lands, the governor of DIY—represented by the head of Panitikismo 
KGPH Hadiwinoto—stated that the residents involved in the conflict 
did not have any rights over the lands. He accused the residents of pur-
posefully building and developing property unlawfully to claim rights 
to compensation (Afandi 2016; Riyadi 2016). The political-economic 
interests of the elites were also apparent as the two types of land became 
a source of income through shares of Hotel Ambarukmo, Ambarukmo 
Plaza, Saphier Square, and Padang Golf Merapi (Aditjondro 2011).
The enactment of the UUK has fostered many agrarian conflicts 
in DIY, including the NYIA construction dispute. LBH Yogyakarta 
reported that in 2015, there was a rising trend in human rights viola-
tions pertaining to the right to work and proper living. This trend was 
attributed to UUK DIY. This fact is in line with the FKMA’s record 
that shows that since the enactment of UU Keistimewaan, the num-
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ber of agrarian conflicts in DIY has significantly increased along with 
the emergence of activism to oppose the domination of SG and PAG 
ownership.
Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta in the 
vortex of agrarian conf licts
Based on data from BPS, the poverty rate in DIY is above the national 
average, while inequality in DIY reached 0.43% in March 2017. The 
percentage was higher than the national inequality rate, which was 
0.39%, and placed DIY at the second rank after Papua (Himawan 2017). 
One of the factors behind this poor economic condition was the domi-
nation and management of land as means of production and control 
over its utilization, which often results in vertical agrarian conflicts 
(Subektie 2018). After the reform era, there were around 24 agrarian 
conflicts in DIY.
Conf lict over the Construction of the NYIA Megaproject 
in Temon Distr ict, Kulon Progo Regency in 2012–2018 
In Organization Conflict: Concept and Models, Louis R. Pondy discuss-
es conflicts in terms of five stages. The first stage is the latent conflict 
stage (condition), which is marked by the emergence of conflict drivers. 
Second is the perceived conflict stage where a party or actor perceives 
the other as a threat. Third is the felt conflict stage, where a party fully 
realizes the imbalance of power or position between them and the other 
parties. Fourth is the manifest conflict stage, where two parties engage 
in open confrontation, such as demonstrations, sabotage, and boycott. 
Fifth is the conflict aftermath stage, which consists of two possibilities: 
(a) the formulation of conflict resolution to accommodate the parties 
involved or (b) the escalation of conflict (Pondy 1967).
In the context of the NYIA megaproject conflict, the latent conflict 
stage began with the signing of a memorandum of understanding be-
tween PT Angkasa Pura I (AP I) and the Indian investment company 
GVK Power and Infrastructure on January 25, 2011. The construction 
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project was designed through a public–private partnership that involved 
foreign investors, without support from the national budget during its 
construction phase (Suharjono 2017). On May 11, the government of 
DIY, represented by Sri Sultan HB X, signed an memorandum of un-
derstanding with PT AP I, represented by Tommy Soetomo, director 
of Gedung Pracimosono, Kepatihan Complex. On May 13, the coast of 
Temon District, Kulon Progo was set as the destination for the translo-
cation of Bandara Adisucipto, which has an area of 637 ha and covers 
six villages. The felt conflict stage was marked by the formation of the 
WTT (Wahana Tri Tunggal) as an organization of collective opposi-
tion to the site’s construction on September 9, 2012. The organization 
comprises the residents as well as farmers impacted by the construction. 
The number of the organization’s members was estimated at 11,501 
residents from 2,875 family units and six villages impacted.
The Dynamics of Vertical Conf lict: Physical 
Violence, Intimidation, Human Rights 
Violations, and Criminalization
The manifest conflict stage of the NYIA megaproject conflict was dy-
namic and accompanied by other events that contributed to the es-
calation of conflict. The conflict at this stage did not occur imme-
diately, as it was preceded by several triggers that may be categorized 
as latent conflicts. The WTT consolidated itself with other grass-roots 
organizations, such as the PPLP (Paguyuban Petani Lahan Pantai), a 
grass-roots organization whose main agenda is to oppose the mining 
of iron sand and the building of steel mills. Each year, the number of 
WTT members has declined. In November 2016, the WTT had 300 
family units as its members, but before 2016, the organization had 600 
(Reza 2016). The decline in these numbers can be attributed to the ap-
proaches employed by PT AP I and village officials. On April 16, 2017, 
the WTT formed the Paguyuban Warga Penolak Penggusuran Kulon 
Progo (PWPP-KP) in Glagah Village as a response to the declining 
number of their members. The formation of the PWPP-KP involved an 
estimated 300 people from eighty-six family units (Rimbawana 2017).
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The formation of the PWPP-KP indicated the conflict’s shift to 
the conflict aftermath stage. This stage occurred when the structural 
violence employed by the authorities was not sufficient to smooth the 
agenda of land clearing, which began on November 27, 2017. The 
land clearing started after President Joko Widodo issued Presidential 
Regulation No. 98/2017 on Acceleration of Airport Development and 
Operation in Kulon Progo on October 23, 2017. Opposition came from 
university students, workers, farmers from various regions in the country 
and (tergabung) Forum Sekolah Bersama (Sekber), Forum Komunikasi 
Masyarakat Agraris, GESTOP BYIA, and other NGOs (Forum Komu-
nikasi Masyarkat Agraria (FKMA) 2018). To ease the eviction process, 
PT AP I along with PT PLN cut the electricity supply in the area 
on November 27–29, 2017. The eviction was accompanied by physical 
violence, intimidation, criminalization, and the detention of volunteers 
and activists by PT AT, PT PP, and PT SKS. The authorities involved 
included 400 municipal police personnel, police, the military, and civil 
officers. The authorities employed repressive measures, such as breaking 
down doors, demolishing places of worship, and barring residents from 
entering their homes (Putsanra 2017).
During the land clearing on December 5, 2017, an artist who was 
part of the Aliansi Warga Tolak Bandara, Hermanto, was injured be-
cause of being dragged by the authorities and hit by stones when he 
attempted to prevent his art studio from being demolished by an excava-
tor. Hermanto said that he never signed any land sale agreements and or 
consignation (Edi 2017). Fajar, Hermanto’s brother, was strangled and 
dragged by the authorities as well, when he tried to protect his backyard. 
In addition to the destruction of property and homes, the December 
5 eviction also involved the arrest of twelve activists on the charge of 
provocation (Ratnasari 2017).
The horizontal conf lict between residents
Besides the internal conflict within the WTT, the formation of Ge 
mas NYIA, MPK, and FRWT (Forum Rembug Warga Transparansi) 
as competing grass-roots organizations that support the construction 
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of the NYIA also became a source of horizontal conflict between the 
residents who were impacted. According to the WTT, two organizations 
were formed by the government of Kulon Progo on April 14, 2014, to 
generate support for the construction of the NYIA. Days after their 
formation, these groups made banners expressing their support for the 
project. This bipolarization of stances eroded the social cohesion and 
solidarity of the local community. An example of horizontal conflict is 
the ripping and confiscation of banners showing support for the NYIA 
construction on April 30, 2014 (Subandar 2014).
Residents who had previously lived and worked together harmoni-
ously, through their farming activities, grew hostile toward each other 
because of these different perspectives. One of those impacted is Kelik 
Martono, who has cut off all communication with members of his 
family who support the construction (Ibrahim 2017). The residents in 
support of the construction of the NYIA demanded the speeding up of 
the project as they perceived the project to be in accordance with the 
laws (Interview with Sri Mulyanto, December 20, 2018). They viewed 
the activists, especially university students and the campus press, as 
provocateurs behind the opposition to the construction.
DR I V ERS OF THE N Y I A MEGA PROJECT CONFLICT
Elitist decision-making
In the eyes of the central government, the construction of the NYIA 
was a manifestation of their ambition to build an aerotropolis—a city 
that has its spatial layout, economic sector, and infrastructure centred 
around the airport. Aerotropolises are built to drive the growth of the 
economy through the construction of complementary sites or zones, 
such as shopping areas, culinary sites, hotels, business districts, cultural 
sites, and tourism destinations. The existence of an airport also drives 
the development of other infrastructure, such as highways and railroads. 
The downside of this concept is that local small and medium enter-
prises will become marginalized, as the flow of profit will be exclusive 
to transnational companies (Rose 2015).
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Politically, the NYIA was designed through an MP3EI policy 
scheme during the administration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Ah-
mad 2018). The scheme designs systems of connectivity and economic 
zonation of each region; through this scheme, Yogyakarta was designed 
to be a region built on the meeting, incentive, convention, and exhibi-
tion (MICE) concept. Fundamentally, the MP3EI was based on an 
Asian free-market framework, the Comprehensive Asian Development 
Bank (CADP). The framework was formulated by the Economic Re-
search Institute for ASEAN, an Asian economic think-tank, in 2010. 
The combination of the pressure to overcome the 2008 economic crisis 
and the ambition for economic growth in Asia became the justification 
behind the formulation of the CADP. This scheme has a high chance 
of shifting the function of infrastructure from being the provider of 
public service for the people to an area of business serving industrial 
interests (Rachman 2014).
The MP3EI was then adopted in the formulation of the National 
Medium-Term Development Plan (Rancangan Pembangunan Jangka 
Menengah Nasional) for 2015–2019, under the Joko Widodo administra-
tion. The framework sets Yogyakarta as an area of service and tourism. 
However, the NYIA project was not part of the RPJMN, as cited in the 
Deputy for Facilities and Infrastructure of Bappenas’s document pre-
sented in Ambon in December 2014. The Ministry of Tourism’s finan-
cial report in 2016 showed an increase in foreign tourist arrivals—12.1 
million arrivals—or 100.2% from the initial target and 15.54% more 
than that of the previous year. Amid the decreasing revenue from the 
coal, palm oil, and oil and gas trades, these foreign tourist arrivals were 
able to contribute IDR176–184 trillion to the country from its initial 
target of 172 trillion. As a response to this achievement, the Ministry 
of Tourism targeted to attract 17 million foreign tourists to the country 
in 2018, higher than the previous year’s target, which was set at 10.46 
million (Kementerian Pariwisata 2017). 
To meet that target, in May 2016, Minister of Tourism Arief Ya-
hya allocated a budget of USD755.5 million to tourism infrastructure, 
which included eleven priority destinations equivalent to Dewata Island. 
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Those eleven priority destinations were then narrowed down to three in 
November 2016: Lake Toba, Mandalika, and Borobudur (Bridger 2017). 
Similar to the central government, the government of DIY and the 
government of Kulon Progo Regency’s policy orientation is influenced 
by economic considerations, especially the tourism sector. To them, 
the NYIA is deemed necessary to replace Adisucipto Airport, which 
has limited capacity and is impossible to expand further. Since 2013, 
there has been a surge in the number of passengers, which reached 2 
million, while the area of Adisucipto Airport’s terminal is 15,000 square 
meters and is built to accommodate only 1.2 million passengers per 
year (Putera 2018).
Air traffic has also increased each year; in 2016, the number reached 
53,752 and in 2017, the number was 57,677, with an average increase 
rate of 7.30% (Sikumbang 2018). According to Agus Pandu Purnama, 
PT AP I general manager for Adisucipto Airport, this situation limits 
the movement of passengers in the airport. This infrastructural capac-
ity limitation is predicted to result in a low occupancy rate of hotels in 
Yogyakarta, which only reached 50 % despite the many foreign airlines 
that take direct flight routes to Yogyakarta (Sikumbang 2018).
The government of DIY’s support for the development of the ur-
ban area is reflected in the opening of investment opportunities in the 
rapidly growing property and hospitality sector. Data shows that the 
increase in the number of hotels in Yogyakarta has a significant posi-
tive correlation with the increase in tourist arrivals. Data from Dinas 
Pariwisata Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta shows a 263% surge in the re-
gion’s number of hotels and 283% in the number of tourist arrivals, both 
foreign and domestic, over the course of five years (Dinas Pariwisata 
2017). The increase in the number of hotels resulted in competition 
within the hospitality industry.
To prevent market saturation, as an interest group in the hospitality 
industry, PHRI recommended government direct investment in Kabu-
paten Gunungkidul, Bantul, and Kulon Progo. Out of the three regions, 
Kabupaten Kulon Progo became a priority destination. The main con-
sideration behind this decision was the NYIA megaproject (Linangkung 
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2017). Thus, it was inevitable that the property and hospitality sector 
became the most popular target of investment in Kabupaten Kulon-
progo (DPMPT Kulon Progo 2019).
Based on a study conducted by Tim Persiapan Pembangunan Ban-
dara Baru (P2B2), one of the reasons behind the opposition to the con-
struction of the NYIA was ambiguity and a lack of consensus regarding 
the compensation for the residents’ lands (Rizqiyah 2017). The mecha-
nism of compensation through consignation was deemed harmful and 
unaccommodating to the residents who opposed the construction of 
the NYIA. The residents who objected to the construction of the NYIA 
perceived the compensation as a form of unfair and biased transac-
tion. According to Presidential Regulation No. 71/2012, consignation 
is a mechanism of compensation for parties who agree to relinquish 
the rights to their land. Therefore, negotiation and consensus should 
emphasize compensation instead of whether the lands in question are 
to be sold (Saluang 2018). The negotiations that emphasized the lat-
ter led the residents who opposed the construction also to oppose the 
procedure of consignation.
This condition opened up room for other problems, such as nega-
tive “improvisation” by officials to meet the construction target. The 
pressure from the central government to speed up the construction 
prompted officials to use repressive means to clear the lands, such as 
terror, force, and intimidation. The use of such measures was accom-
panied by framing of residents who refused to sell their lands, where 
they were framed as though they were protesting their compensation 
(Saluang 2018). According to the PWPP-KP, the government of Kulon 
Progo, the vice head of the Wates Court and PT AP I acted as though 
the process of consignation was still ongoing despite the procedure be-
ing under investigation by Ombudsman DIY due to an indication of 
maladministration (PWPP-KP 2018).
Acts of intimidation and terror in the name of consignation during 
the process of land clearing were carried out starting on November 
27, 2017. Police officials took down the electric meters of the houses 
of residents who refused to give up their land. The residents repeat-
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edly demanded warrants and letters of assignment for the land clear-
ing but were ignored by the authorities. Furthermore, the authorities 
destroyed the houses of residents who had not received compensation 
before those who had. On December 4, a clash took place between the 
residents and officials, as well as the arrest of twelve students who were 
accused of provocation (Savitri et al. 2018). An investigation conducted 
by Ombudsman DIY discovered that the police were involved in the 
land clearing, the destruction of building and electric meters, and the 
cutting of the electricity supply. The investigation suggested that there 
was a conduct of maladministration as the police seemed to assume 
the role and position of PT AP I rather than as officers whose main 
responsibility is to maintain the protection and safety of the people 
(Pertana 2017).
The PWPP-KP’s course to reject the consignation system was sup-
ported by LBH Yogyakarta as the mechanism aimed to confiscate prop-
erty unilaterally without the consent of the people. The law stipulates 
that the system of compensation can be conducted through consigna-
tion under the condition that (1) the landowner rejects the compen-
sation or decision made by the court, or (2) the land in question is a 
matter of a legal problem or dispute. The consequence of the mecha-
nism was that the parties who consistently rejected the land clearing 
were deemed “to have lost the battle” as the mechanism involved the 
estimation of the value of the property and forced the residents to give 
up their rights over their lands (Resnanto 2017).
Ideally, consignation is conducted when the whereabouts of the 
party involved is unknown or when the ownership of the land is an 
object of legal dispute. These conditions were not met in the case of 
the NYIA conflict (Aziz 2017). Furthermore, Law No. 2/2012 Article 
36 Clause 3 stipulates that the compensation should be agreed upon by 
both parties. In reality, this mechanism of consignation created a “new 
alternative” for residents who rejected the construction of the NYIA, 
where they were forced to request a “re-estimation” of the value of their 
land when their opposition to the land clearing was deemed unlawful.
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Kadipaten Pakualaman, as deputy to the governor of DIY, domi-
nated the ownership of the land impacted by the construction: an area 
of 160 ha, or 27% of the total land needed for the site’s construction 
(Permana 2017). The legality of the ownership is based on UU Keis-
timewaan DIY, which contained provisions from Rijskblad Pakualaman 
Tahun 1918, that was enacted during the Dutch colonial era. To the resi-
dents who opposed the NYIA construction, as well as the intellectual 
groups and NGOs supporting them, the law was abolished when the 
UUPA was fully enacted in DIY, although the residents who managed 
and cultivated the lands in PAG—through the building and creation of 
property, fish farms, or agriculture—did not possess land titles (Goldie 
2018).
Residents who joined PKPLP, a group consisting of farmers and 
cultivators in PAG, had to release their land with a compensation that 
was miniscule compared to the profit that Pakualaman obtained, which 
reached IDR702 billion from the total of IDR727 billion. The PKPLP 
demanded compensation of one-third to one-half of the total profit 
received by Pakualaman. Pakualaman rejected the request and chose 
to provide compensation in the form of the tali asih program, or expres-
sion of gratitude. The FKPLP felt that they played a significant role in 
the cultivation of Pakualaman land, which contributed to the region’s 
agrarian productivity. The FKPLP finally received financial compensa-
tion of IDR25 billion through the Pakualaman’s instruction to Regent 
of Kulon Progo, Hasto Wardoyo in late October 2017 (Jati 2017).
Governance driver of conf lict: Lack of dialogue and 
consultation between the community and PT AP I
This problem was reflected in the process of consignation, where the 
lands of the residents who opposed the construction were entrusted to 
the Wates Court. AS a result, the residents lost their normative rights to 
their land despite their possession of certificates, girik, or other proof of 
ownership. The residents also refused to fulfill consignation summonses 
from the court, claiming that they never submitted proof of ownership 
to the court and that there was an absence of land valuation. The resi-
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dents also did not attend public consultations or negotiations pertaining 
to land transactions with PT AP I (Aziz 2017). This issue underlay the 
demonstration opposing the consignation that took place in the court’s 
yard on March 2, 2017 (Widiyanto 2017).
Initially, the WTT refused to attend the public consultation regard-
ing the construction of the NYIA. The head of the WTT said that 
residents unconditionally refused to compromise. However, on Sep-
tember 23, 2014, the organization decided to attend the third public 
consultation—those who did not come were even assumed to support 
the construction. The WTT planned to attend the public consultation 
with a formal invitation. However, security officers prevented their ar-
rival without explanation (Putri and Astarina 2015). The secretary of 
PT AP I claimed that the measure was taken in anticipation of the 
WTT’s protests, which might result in other invitees not coming (Ibra-
him 2017).When the IPL was issued, only 10% of residents (consisting of 
civil servants, military, and police personnel) agreed to the construction, 
while 60% refused (farmers) and the remaining others refused to state 
their stance (Imelda 2017). Public consultations were conducted several 
times, but the dialogues with the WTT were not conducive and par-
ticipative. The consultation on March 3, 2015, did not Invite 50 WTT 
members who owned land in the area. A similar situation happened 
during the February 26, 2015, consultation and the November 10, 2016, 
discussion on the assessment of environmental impacts (Amdal). The 
consultations only involved residents who supported the construction, 
who were also selected by their head of villages. The WTT said that 
this measure was taken to ensure the formulation of an environmental 
impact assessment (Amdal) that served the interests of the government 
and PT AP I (Imelda 2017).
Social dr iver of conf lict: Perception of harms
The P2B2 and PT AP I team said that the are several reasons underlay 
the residents’ opposition to the construction of the NYIA (Rizqiyah 
2017). First, the residents were reluctant to hand over their land to be-
gin with. Second, the lands had been passed down from generation to 
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generation. This argument was often used by the residents, despite their 
being offered a large sum of money—up to billions—to compensate 
them for their land. Third, the residents were content with their farm-
ing livelihoods. Fourth, uncertainty surrounded the residents’ business 
enterprises. Fifth, for the members of WTT, the areas of land in ques-
tion were their main means of production, which had contributed to 
the development of the area’s agrarian economy through the residents’ 
labor and farm produce. To them, the construction of the NYIA would 
reduce their productivity because of the decrease in land capability; 
300 ha, or almost half of the construction site, is comprised of arable—
both wet and dry—land (Amin 2018).
It was estimated that around 148,000 farmers would lose their live-
lihoods that depended on the production of eggplant, squash, water-
melons, melons, and chilis. From every hectare, the farmers were able 
to harvest an average of 60 tons of squash, 180 tons of melons, 90 
tons of watermelons, 90 tons of eggplant, and 30 tons of chilis (Niam 
2017). Furthermore, the production of rice was also predicted to wane 
to around 6 tons per ha each year because of the clearing of 100.37 ha 
of rice fields (Evani 2018). The Perda No. 2/2010 Article 51 Point G 
stipulates that the region of Kabupaten Kulon Progo is protected farm-
ing land, both its wet and dry lands. According to data from BPS, 
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, Kabupaten Kulon Progo consisted of productive 
farming land that made up one of the main providers of food in DIY 
(Ahmad 2018). The construction of the NYIA was proven to result in 
the rise in food insecurity in Kecamatan Temon, from 87 to 90% in 
2018 (Nurpita, Wihastuti, and Andjani 2018).
The construction of the NYIA also threatened the region’s cultural 
heritage. Those cultural heritage sites include Stupa Glagah, Arca Per-
unggu Amonghasidhi dan Vajrapani, Batu Bata Besar, Lumpang Batu, 
Makam Mbah Drajat, Situs Petilasan Gunung Lanang and Gunung 
Putri, and Batu Besar Eyang Gadhung Mlati. These sites are legally 
protected in the DIY Gubernatorial Regulation No. 62/2013 on the 
Preservation of Cultural Heritage (PWPP-KP 2018).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the discussion above, the author concludes that the conflict 
related to the construction of the NYIA megaproject was caused by at 
least three main drivers: (a) elitist-based interests, (b) governance driver 
of conflict, and (c) social driver of conflict. The premise for elite-based 
interests is founded on two main arguments and field findings, which 
are (a) the economic argument about the pressure for the growth of the 
tourism industry, and (b) the political argument on the domination of 
land ownership by elites in DIY and its preservation through Law No. 
13/2012. At least two arguments explain the elitist policy-making in the 
construction of the NYIA megaproject: the economic and the political 
argument. The economic argument revolves around the convergence of 
local and national elites’ interests shaped by pressure for the economic 
growth of the tourism industry. The political argument explains how 
the domination of land ownership by Kadipaten Pakualaman continued 
to be legitimized through Presidential Regulation No. 71/2012 and Law 
No. 2/2012, which legitimize the confiscating nature and unilateral 
procedure of consignation.
Based on Molotch’s (1976) theory on elite-based interests in urban 
development, the economic argument concerns the pressure for tourism 
growth, both from the regional and the national government. The po-
litical argument is built on the domination of land ownership by palace 
elites (Kadipaten Pakualaman and Kasultanan) that is legitimized by 
UUK DIY and other special regional laws, as well as the arrangement 
of unfair compensation through consignation. Another factor that con-
tributed to the conflict is the lack of consultation between the residents 
impacted by the construction and PT AP I as the executor of the proj-
ect. Along with the minimum compensation given to the residents 
impacted by the construction, these problems make up the governance 
and social drivers of conflict.
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